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Plaintiff and Appellant Energy Management Services, LLC ("Plaintiffs")
respectfully submits this Reply Brief.
I. ARGUMENT

A.

This Court's Recent Reversal Of The Order Granting Summary
Judgment In The Third District Action Requires That The Trial
Court's Grant Of Summary Judgment In This Action Be Summarily
Reversed.

It is undisputed that (1) the Trial Court's grant of summary judgment in this matter
was based solelv on the Trial Court's conclusion that Plaintiffs' claims in this matter

were barred by resjudicata as a result of the order granting summary judgment that

previously had been entered in the Third District Action; and (2) after the Trial Court

entered its order granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in this action, this
Court reversed the judgment previously entered in the Third District Action {see Energy

Management Services, LLC v. Shaw, 2005 UT App 90, 110 P.3d 158). Under these
circumstances, the Trial Court's decision must be summarily reversed and the case

should be remanded for trial. See e.g., Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Mayer, 883 P.2d 1358 (Utah
1994); Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 227, 230-31 (Utah 1992).

In its Opposition Brief, Del Rio does not contest the above-referenced facts and
does not address the above-referenced case law. Instead, Del Rio provides only a cursory

1On July 2, 2004, the Trial Court granted a Motion to Substitute Energy Management
Services, LLC for the Plaintiffs in this case. The Motion for Summary Judgment and
Memorandum in Support thereof refer to "Plaintiffs" in the plural and Defendants'

argument requires comparisons between this action and an earlier action in which there
were Plaintiffs. To avoid confusion, therefore, this brief also refers to appellant EMS as
"Plaintiffs" and to Defendants Del Rio Resources, Inc. and Del Rio Drilling Programs,

Inc. collectively as Del Rio. Defendant Dan K. Shaw will be referred to as "Shaw."

response to Plaintiff;' argument concerning the effect of the reversal of thejudgment in
the Third District Action. See, Defs.' Opp'n Br. at pp. 11-12.

Del Rio's cursory argument attempts to trivialize this Court's reversal of the

summaryjudgment in the Third District Action. Del Rio's claim that "the District
Court's ruling that the Plaintiffs' claim to the Leases fails as a matter of law remains

intact" (Opp'n Br. at 12) is simply incorrect. In reversing the entry of summa-ry judgment
in the Third District Action, this Court did not endorse or affirm the Trial Court's ruling

on the merits. Rather, this Court expressly stated that it "need not address the substance

of the parties' summaryjudgment arguments as we conclude that EMS is entitled to have
the Trial Court consider and rule on its request for additional discovery." Energy
Management Services, 110 P.3d at 160.

By definition, the reversal of the summaryjudgment in the Third District Action
rendered that judgment of no further force or effect and eliminated the bas's for the Trial
Court's finding of resjudicata in this action. See Phebus v. Dunford, 114 Utah 292, 198
P.2d 973, 974 (Utah 1948) (A reversal of a judgment or decision of a lower court such as

this places the case in the position it was in before the lower court rendered that judgment
or decision, and vacates all proceedings and orders dependent upon the decision which
was reversed). As a result, the Trial Court's judgment in this case also must be reversed
and the case must be remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings. Ron Shepherd,

883 P.2d at 1358; Sandy City, 827 P.2d at 230-31; see also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JuxiMENTS, § 16, cmt. C (1982) ("If, when the earlier judgment is set aside or reversed, .

. . an appeal has been taken and remains undecided, a party may inform the trial or

appellate court of the nullification of the earlier judgment and the consequent elimination
of the basis for the later judgment. The court should then normally set aside the later
judgment.").
The mere fact that the Third District Action was remanded to the Trial Court for

further proceedings consistent with this Court's opinion does not limit the impact of the
reversal on this case. In both the Ron Shepherd case and the Sandy City case, the fact that
the earlier judgment had been reversed and remanded to the Trial Court for further

proceedings consistent with this Court's decisions did not prevent this Court from

reversing the second judgment which was based on the res judicata or collateral estoppel
effect of the first judgment. Plaintiffs believe that they will prevail on remand in the
Third District Action. Obviously, Del Rio disagrees. However, until the Court has ruled

once again on the merits in the Third District Action, there simply is no viable judgment
on the merits upon which a finding of resjudicata can be based.

Del Rio's suggestion that this Court should not give any effect to the reversal of
the judgment in the Third District Action because Del Rio anticipates that "the

proceedings on the Rule 56(0 affidavit will be completed, and the Third District Court
judgment reinstated, well before proceedings on this appeal are completed" (Opp'n Br. at

12) is based entirely on unfounded speculation.2 Plaintiffs have renewed their Rule 56(0
Motion.3 Additionally, on July 20, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a new Motion to Amend their

2 Del Rio's use of the term "reinstated" shows that Del Rio recognizes that the reversed

judgment in the Third District Action has no present validity or effect.
3The judgment in the Third District Action was reversed on February 25, 2005, with the
remittur being issued on May 5, 2005. The Trial Court granted Plaintiffs' Rule 56(0

Complaint with the Trial Court.4 Del Rio apparently believes that the trial court will
deny Plaintiffs' Rule 56(0 Motion and then reinstate its Order granting summary

judgment. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, believe that the trial court will grant the Rule

56(0 Motion and the Motion to Amend5 and that Plaintiffs ultimately will prevail at trial.
At this point in these proceedings, there simply is no way to predict with certainty how
the trial court will rule in the Third District Action. Under these circumstances, Plaintiffs

respectfully submit that the above-cited case law requires that the Trial Court's judgment
in this action be reversed and that the case be remanded to the Trial Court for further

proceedings. At a minimum. Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the proceedings in this
appeal must be stayed pending issuance of a final judgment in the Third District Action.
See Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 16, cmt. B (suggesting that it may be

advisable for the court that is being asked to apply an earlier judgment as res judicata to

Motion by Minute Order dated July 12, 2005. However, because as a result of a clerical
error, counsel for Del Rio never received a copy of Plaintiffs' renewed Rule 56(0
Motion, the parties have stipulated that the Trial Court should vacate its Ju'.y 12, 2005
Order and rule again on the Rule 56(0 Motion after it is fully briefed and submitted for
decision by the parties.

4On November 12, 2002, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to File a First Amended Complaint in
the Third District Action. Judge Livingston did not address or rule on the Motion to
Amend. Instead, on November 14, 2002, Judge Livingston issued his order granting
summaryjudgment in the Third District Action. Plaintiffs appealed that Order.
Thereafter, by Minute Order dated March 29, 2003, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit A and is incorporated herein by reference, Judge Hilder denied Plaintiffs' Motion
to Amend on the grounds that Plaintiffs' appeal of the Order granting summaryjudgment
deprived the Court ofjurisdiction to rule on the Motion to Amend. In his Order, Judge
Hilder stated, among other things, that if Plaintiffs "prevail on appeal and the matter is
returned to this Court, amendment is likely available."

'^ If Plaintiffs1 Motior to Amend their Complaint in the Third District Action is granted, it
should render the issues raised in this case moot.

stay its own proceedings while awaiting the ultimate disposition of the earlier case, either

in the trial court or on appeal.)6
B.

Del-Rio Did Not Establish At Trial The Elements Necessary To Invoke
The Doctrine Of Res Judicata.

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs do not believe that it is necessary for this
Court to address or determine at this time "whether the trial judge was correct in holding

that the criteria for [res judicata] were met, since the decision relied upon for the finding
of [resjudicata] has been overturned in the [Third District Action]." See Sandy City, 827
P.2d at 230. Nevertheless, in the event that this Court believes it is necessary or

appropriate to address this issue at this time, Plaintiffs respectfully submit the following
argument.

The parties seem to agree, and the law is clear, that the claim preclusion branch of
resjudicata bars a subsequent claim only if the movant demonstrates the existence of the
following three factors: (1) both cases involve the same parties or their privy; (2) the first

suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the claim was either (a) presented
in the first suit, or (b) could have and should have been presented in the first suit. Sec

() Comment B to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OE JUDGMENTS, § 16 states that "This course
commends itself if the disposition will not be long delayed and especially if there is
substantial doubt whether the judgment will be upheld." In this case, there certainly is
substantial doubt concerning whether the reversed judgment in the Third District Action
ever will be reinstated. There is no assurance, however, that resolution of the Third
District Action on remand "will not be long delayed." As a result, Plaintiffs respectfully
submit that reversal of the judgment in this action is the better course. Nevertheless,
simultaneously with the filing of this Reply Brief, Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Stay
these proceedings in the event that this Court believes that it is more appropriate to stay

the proceedings, rather than to simply reverse the judgment, pending a final judgment in
the Third District Action.

e.g., Maoris & Assoc, v. Noways, Inc., 2000 UT 93,1|20, 16 P.3d 1214. Plaintiffs
conceded the existence of the first two factors in the Trial Court.

Thus, the focus of the

argument is whether Del Rio properly established the existence of the third factor before

the Trial Court. Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Del Rio did not, and cannot,
establish the existence of the third factor.
1.

Plaintiffs' Current Claims Were Not Presented In The Third
District Action.

Contrary to Eel Rio's argument, all of Plaintiffs' claims in this action were not
presented in the Third District Action. The Complaint in the Third District Action
presented a single claim for declaratory judgment. R. 239-293. The Complaint in this

case presented three different claims - quiet title, constructive trust, and breach of joint
venture partnership - and did not reassert: the declaratory judgment claim already

determined in the Third District Action. R. 2-9. Although it is true that the quiet title
claim and the constructive trust claim in the Complaint in this action sought an interest in
the same Leases in which Plaintiffs sought an interest in the Third District Aciion,

Plaintiffs' alternative: claim for breach of joint venture partnership in this case sought
only damages - which is different from the relief that h£.d been sought in the Third

District Action." Thus, contrary to Del Rio's argument, Plaintiffs have not sought the

' Plaintiffs' concession of the existence of a final judgment on the merits in the first
action was subject to Plaintiffs' noting that the judgment in the Third District Action was
on appeal. For the reasons set forth above, the reversal of the judgment in the Third
District Action by ths Court has changed things so that there now no longer is a final
judgment on the mer.ts that can serve as the basis for res judicata.

hThe Complaint in the Third District Action also included a request for "money
damages", R. 293, but this simply was a reference to the same res which was the subject

same relief in this action that they sought in the prior Third District Action, and Plaintiffs
cannot be viewed as having actually presented the same claims in this action as were
presented in the Third District Action.

2.

Although Plaintiffs Could Have Presented All Of The Claims
Asserted In This Action In The Third District Action, They
Were Not Required To Do So.

Del Rio argues at length that all of Plaintiffs' claims in this action should be
barred by resjudicata because all of these claims supposedly could have and should have
been raised in the Third District Action. Del Rio's arguments cannot withstand analysis.
a.

Del Rio's Reliance On The AEM And Wheadon Cases

Ignores The Utah Supreme Court's More Recent Decision
In Macris.

Del Rio relies heavily in this Court's 1999 decision in American Estate

Management v. Int'l Investment &Development Corp., 1999 UT App. 232, 986 P.2d 765
("AEM') and the Utah Supreme Court's 1962 decision in Wheadon v. Pearson, 14

Utah.2d 45, 376 P.2d 946 (1962). These cases did involve the application ofres judicata

principles. However, after these cases were decided, the Utah Supreme Court issued its
decision in Macris. Thus, it is Macris, and not AEMor Wheadon, which provides the

of Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment claim, i.e. the monetary proceeds recovered in the

Claims Court Litigation. The claim for breach ofjoint venture partnership in this action
does not seek a declaratory judgment or damages relating to the Claims Court Litigation

proceeds. Rather, through the alternative claim for breach ofjoint venture partnership in
this case Plaintiffs seek an accounting in damages relating to their interest in all assets of
the joint venture.

most recent guidance to this Court from the Utah Supreme Court concerning resjudicata
principles.

As noted in Plaintiffs' Opening Brief, Macris specifically holds that claim

preclusion applies only where there is an identity of facts and evidence between the
claims presented in the two actions. Macris, 2000 UT at| 28, 16 P.3d at 1221 (". . . the
cause of action in the present suit must be identical to the one brought in the prior suit.").
In determining whether claims are identical for resjudicata purposes, the focus is upon
whether the two causes of action rest on a different state of facts and evidence of a

different kind or character is necessary to sustain the two causes of action. Id. Moreover,
even if a plaintiff is aware of the factual basis of a suit at the time of filing another suit,
he or she is not required to bring all claims together if there is no identity of facts and
evidence between tfo two claims. Id.

Del Rio seems to acknowledge, as it must, that the claims asserted by Plaintiffs in

this case contain different elements and require different proof than the declaratory relief

Del Rio attempts to chastise Plaintiffs for not addressing AEM in their opening brief.
Plaintiffs did not address AEM because Plaintiffs thought it was more appropriate to
focus on the Utah Supreme Court's more recent decision in Macris.

claim asserted by Plaintiffs in the Third District Action.10 Thus, under the rules set forth
in Macris, application of resjudicata in this case was inappropriate. 11
b.

The Mere Fact That Macris Did Not Involve Claims To

Interests In Real Property Does Not Render Its Holding
Inapplicable To This Case.
Del Rio attempts to distinguish Maoris on the grounds that it did not involve

claims to interests in real property. This effort fails because, although the facts in Macris
did not involve an interest in real property, the case primarily relied upon in Macris,
Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983), did involve claims to interests in real

property. The Utah Supreme Court's reliance on its holding in Schaer in its decision in
Macris shows that the Utah Supreme Court believes that the same principles governing
res judicata apply regardless of whether a case involves interest in real property or some
other interests.

lU The focus of the Third District Action was the parties' rights and obligations under the
1995 Agreement and the relating funding agreement subsequently entered into between
Plaintiffs Dan Shaw and Del-Rio Resources, Inc. The claims in this action arise out of a

joint venture agreement which predated the 1995 Agreement and the related funding
agreement. Thus, the proof required in this case will be fundamentally different from that
which was (and will be) submitted in the Third District Action.

11 Del Rio argues that this Court should ignore the Utah Supreme Court's statements in
Macris because these statements supposedly are mere dicta. This is not the case. Rather,
the Utah Supreme Court presented two alternative explanations in Macris for why res
judicata did not apply. Each of the alternative explanations offered by the Utah Supreme
Court is equally viable, and each of these explanations is binding on this Court. See Utah
Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm n of Utah, 73 Utah 199, 273 P. 306, 309 (Utah 1928)
(Where an appellate court bases its decision on two or more distinct grounds, each is as
much an authoritative determination as the other, and neither can be disregarded as

dictum); Jones v. Mutual Creamery Co., 81 Utah 223, 17 P.2d 256. 258 (Utah 1932)
(Where two grounds are argued, presented, and involved, on either of which court's
decision can be rested, and both are sustained, ruling on neither is "dictum").

In Schaer, the Utah Supreme Court held that resjudicata did not apply where the
two causes of action rested on a different state facts and evidence of a different kind or

character would be necessary to sustain them, and where the two causes of action related

to the status of property in two different time periods. Schaer, 657 P.2d at 1340. This
case presents a similar situation. As noted above, the causes of action in the Third

District Action and in this case are based on completely different facts and circumstances,

which occurred during completely different time periods.12 Given the similarities
between this case ard Schaer, the rule adopted by the L'tah Supreme Court in Schaer,
which has been recently reaffirmed by the Utah Supreme Court's reliance on Schaer in
Maoris, should apply in this case.
c.

Even If This Court Concluded That Plaintiffs' Claims To

An Interest In The Leases Were Barred By Res Judicata,
This Would Not Bar Plaintiffs' Damages Claim.

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the rule set forth
in Maoris applies to this case. However, even if this Court somehow were to conclude

that different, broader rules for resjudicata were to apply to claims for interests in real
property, ~res judicata still would not bar all of Plaintiffs' claims in this case. As noted

above. Plaintiffs' alternative claim for breach of joint venture agreement in this case
seeks monetary damages, not a specific interest in the Leases. Accordingly, even if this
Court somehow concluded that Plaintiffs'' claims for quiet title and constructive trust (to
" As a result, the facts in this case are much more similar to the facts in Schaer than the

facts presented in cither AEM or Wheadon.
For example, if this Court were to conclude that AEM establishes different, broader

rules for resjudicata in cases involving claims to interests in real property than are set
forth in Maoris.
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the extent that the constructive trust claim seeks an interest in the Leases in question)

were barred by resjudicata, this would not justify barring Plaintiffs' alternative claim for

damages on the basis of resjudicata. Indeed, Del Rio seems to acknowledge in its

Opposition Brief that a claim for damages should and will be treated differently from a
claim to an interest in real property for resjudicata purposes. See, Opp'n Br. at p. 21.

Thus, at the very most, resjudicata could only apply to bar Plaintiffs' claims in this
action for an interest in the Leases in question, and not Plaintiffs' alternative claim for
damages for breach of the joint venture agreement.
II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, and in Plaintiffs' Opening Brief, the Trial Court's

entry of summaryjudgment against Plaintiffs should be reversed and this case should be
remanded for trial.

Respectfully submitted this Tjfaay of August, 2005.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Max D. "^Jjceler
Stanley J. Preston
Bryan M. Scott

Attorneys for Plaintiff'Appellant Energy
Management Sendees, LLC
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MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER
Case No:

DAN K SHAW,

.-

.A
A
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Clerk:

010906358

Date: 03/29/2003

rhilder

Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend their Complaint to assert a new rl,im

against defendanttDel;Rio;Resources.is before the'court for
predecessor'^co'urtv'vJu^e

udgment,
dismissing, all claims'^'" ~
November
14/;
2002), and that dismig
. sal ;.is;npwj!the>ubjecVfof "plaintiffs' *nr„Ur^

Judge Livingston did ^ive plaintiffs^leave^o^amenl their Complaint•

and add a new claim against defendant Dan K."Shaw, but that has no •

effect on any claim against Del-Rio.

This court does not belief

that it has the ability to grant the Motion.

Contrary to

plaintiffs' argument, a final Order of dismissal, on the merits and
disposing of all claims against that defendant, which is now on
appeal, is not subject to revision by the trial court, unbless the
matter is somehow remanded to the trial court and made the subiect
of an appropriate "post-trial" motion. That is simply not the
posture of this case. Plaintiffs are probably right on two points
they urge: First, if they prevail on appeal and the matter is
returned to this court, amendment is likely available. Second if
the statute of limitations has not run, they can file an

independent action, if their new claim does, in fact, have an
independent basis. What they cannot do is amend their claim'
against Del-Rio in this action at this time. The Motion be and
hereby is DENIED. This signed Minute Entry shall be the ORDER of
the court and no further Order is required.
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141 Judgment €^634
228kh34 Most.Cited Cases

Supreme Court of I hah.

Issue preclusion arises from a different cause of
action and prevents parties or Iheir privies from
reinitiating facts and issues in the second suit that
ssere full\ litigated in the first suit

MACRIS & ASSOCIAPHS. INC.. Plaintiff and

Respondent.
v.

M WAVV INC.. I nomas F. Mower, and Leslie 1)
Mower. Defendants and Petitioners.

|5| Judgment €-r~>540

No. 990859.

22SkM() MosLCiied.tlases

Dec 5.2000.

Marketing eompans brought action against succcsmu
health and beautv company for fraudulent transfer,
successor liability, and alter ego. 1he Fourth District
Cour!. Pro\o Department, Howard Maetam J .
granted sum mars judgment to health and beauts
compans Marketing companv appealed. The C. ouri
of Appeals, c;So . jf^LLJ^J^ reversed. Corporation
sought certiorari res iew. The Supreme Court.
!<;;-.-.<M!. Associate C J . held that" ( 1 ) action was not
b.irred hs doctrir.e of res mdicata. but (2i claims \o\

additional cortrac: damages ssere barred b> doctiinc
of issue preclusion.

In order for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent
cause of action, a plaintiff must satist> three
requirements' first, both cases iihm involve the same
parties or their privies: second, the claim that is
alleged to be barred must have been presented in the
first suit or must be one that could and should have
been raised in the first action, third, the first suit must

have resulted in a final judgment on the merits

jfjj. Judgment €^"13(2)
:2Sk"13r2j Most Cited CasePartv is required to include claims m action, tor res

mdicata purposes, onls if those chums arose before
filing of complaint in first action

J21 Judgment €^-n3(2)

.Affirmed in pari and reversed in part

22 Sk"? I 3(2J Most (died (-.a>s^
Res judicata did not bar claim- against successor

\\ est Headnote-.

corporation for fraudulent transfer. successor
habihts. and alter ego. tacts giving rise to plaintiffs
claims, which included predecessor's transfer of its

Hi Certiorari £^(,4(1)
~ ~4,fvii ; i Mosg (. ilea ( ases

assets

to

successor

and

successor's

subsequent

When cvera-ms; its certiorari jurisdiction. Supreme
Lour; reviews the decision of the court of appeals,

takeover of predecessor's business did not arise until
after tiling of complaint in first action against

not of'the trial court

successor, and claims in .second action rested upon
different set of facts than breacli of contract litigation
that was the subject of the first action

121 Certiorari €^(>4(1)
~~-^j,\ ij Moj^j.dted Cases

\\ he:', res iew ins; questions of lass while exerci-ung
certiorari lurisdicfion. Supreme Court accords no

particular deference to the conclusions of lass made
bs the court of appeals but reviews them

tor

correctness

J_SJ Judgment €>"^5S5( 1)
:_2,Sk585LL Most (died t.'ase^.

1*1 Judgment £=3713(1)
22Sk71_3Mj MosUdted (".ase^

|3| Judgment ^--'540
22Sk.Mn Most_Cited t ases

Claim preclusion involves the same parlies or their
pnsic-. and also the same cause of action, and limpieCade-- the relitigation of all issues that coaid h.asc
been htiiiutea as well as those that were, in t.Kt.

For the doctrine ot" res judicata to preclude a
subsequent cause of action, not onl> must the
plaintiff have been aware of the cause of action at the
time the first suit was commenced, hut the cause of

action in the present -ait mast be identical to the one
brought in the prior suit
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J9J Action <^??3(I)
J3k>3(l} Most Cited Case_

necessarils involved in an issue although no specific
finding mas1 have been made in reference to that
matter, aid although such matters were not directly
referred to in the pleadings.

Kven if a plaintiff is aware of the factual basis of a
suit at the filing of another suit, he or she is noi
obligated to bring all clains together if there is no

1H1 Judgment £^713(2)

identitv

22Nk7l3C2j Most Cued ( ases

of facts

and

evidence

between

the

twt>

claims

Uil Judgment £^720

1101 Judgment €^744

228F720 Most Cited Cases

228K74-4 MosjJ itcd Cases

If the second action involves an issue .is to which the

Determination that plaintiff's claims in second action
were not barred b\ claim preclusion did not preclude
determination that plaintiff was prevented by doctrine
of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel from
seeking additional contract damages aiising from fust

judgment in a prior action is a conclusive
ad|iidicati,in. the estoppel, so lar as that issue is
concerned, extends to every matter which was or
might hase been urged to sus'ain or defeat the
determination actualh made.

action.

[15| Stipulations ^---"MO

J211 Judgment 0=>634

3o.3kl6 Most Cited Cases

22_Kk6_14 Mqst.Citcd Cases

An issue determined by stipulation rather than
judicial resolution is binding in a subsequent action if
the parties manifested an intention to that effect.

Four-part test is applied to determine whether
doctrine of issue preclusion is applicable: first, the
issue challenged must be identical in the previous
action and in the case at hand; second, the issue must

116] Judgment £~668(1)

have been decided m a final judgment on the merits

r^NWioNCjJ Most ( died Cases

in the previous action: thirc. the issue must have been
competently, fulls, and fairly litigated in the previous
action; and fourth, the parts' against whom collateral
estoppel is invoked in the current action must have
been either a party o" privy to a party in the previous
action.

1161 Judgment £^6"8(1)
22,Xk(wSiy) Most Cited_Cas.es
Issue preclusion does not requi e that both cases
involve the same parties or their privies: rather, issue

preclusior applies even if onh the parts' against
whom the doctrine is asserted v\as a part) or in

U21 Judgment €^651

priv its wiih a parts to the prior adjudication.
*12I5 D. Frank \\ dkins__ Chris K liogle. Salt Fake
Citv. lor plaintiff.

22Sk(ol Most Cited Cases

|121 Judgment 0^744
22Sk"M4 \1os_: Cited Cases
In action asaainst corporation for fraudulent transfer.
successor liability, and Titer ego. plaintiff was

Allen K. Davis. Christopher S. Crump, Wade S.
\\ inegar. Scott 1. dembv. Salem, 'or defendants.

precluded, under doctrine of collateral estoppel, from

ON CIC-niORAKI J'OTIIF UTAH COURT ()l:

seeking contract damages ii addition lo those sought
in prior breach of contract action, even though issue
ot contract damages was decided b\ stipulation in
first action; issue id' damages resulting from breach
was decided in first aetior, that award of damages
was final, plaintiff had full opportunity to develop its
claim in first action, and phintiff was a parts to both

APPEAFS

actions.

1121 Judgment £=720
22__k;720 MostCited <discs
The general rule precluding the relitigation ot'
material tacts or question- which were in issue di\<.\
adjudicated in a former ac ion extends to questions

Jy'iSSON. Associate Chief Justice

k*i On writ of certiorari, Neways, Inc.. Thomas l\
Mower, and
Leslie D. Mower (collectively,
"Ncwa\s")

seek

teversal

of the

I tah

Court

of

Appeals' determination that Maoris & Associates'
("Macris" claims tor fraudulent transfer, successor
liability, and alter ego are not barred by res judicata.
Neways also claims that the court of appeals erred in
not consicerinu whether Macris is precluded h\ the
doctrine of ies judicata from pursuing additional
contract damages in the present action.
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F\l. d he facts of the litigation and appeal

breached the distributorship agreement by wrongfully
suspending Macris's autoqualiflcation status and
terminating its distributorship, and that Macris was
entitled to damages as a result of that breach. Macris

that led to this case can be found in AA.v^

sought to recover as breach of contract damages

A .-^^i.;f^ v Images cV Ul:;nJ,- ,6?c '-Ml
P 2o 636 a tah Ct,App.l/W7j

("contract damages"!
received as Images's
wrongful termination
matter was set for trial

back<;rouniui_-N!J

'*2
In August 1989, Macris entered into a
distributorship agreement (the "Agreement") with
Images & Attitude ("Images").
Pursuant to the
Agreement. MacrC was to use its time and marketing
expertise to build a "1216 "downline organization"

[F\_2_] within Images's multilevel marketing program.
The Agreement specified that Macris
was
"autoqualified." which, the Agreement stated, meant
that the usual distributor requirements of the Images
marketing plan were waived and Macris was to be
paid at the highest level pros ided for in the
operation's marketing plan for product sales made b>
the distributors in Macris's downline

I lie term, of

the Agreement was to continue "throughout the lite
of Images." as long as Macris was "active in

the payments it would have
distributor but for Images's
of its distributorship.
The
on September 28. 1992.

**5 Approximate!) one month prior to trial, in
August 1992, Newavs. Inc was incorporated, with
'I nomas Mower as its president. It appears from the
record that Thomas Mower was the president of
Images up to the date on which Newavs was created,
whereupon he became the president of Neways.
[FN 3J
Dike Images, Newavs is a multilevel

marketing company engaged in the multilevel sale of
various health and beauty products. On September
!. 1992. Images ceased doing business a*- a multilevel
marketing companv and transferred most of its assets

to Neways.

The new Is formed Nessa>s then took

over the multilevel marketing operations of Images.

promoting Imaues and Images's products."
FN3. In its Findings of fact, the trial court in
FN2. 1 he trial court described a "downline"
as follows

Multilevel marketing is promoted as an

Macris

I

stated'

"Thomas

F

Mower

founded [Images] and served as Us president
at least through August 3 1. 1C)L>2 "

opponunits to bring other people into a
business bs "sponsoring" them and sharing
in the profits that those people bring m bv

sponsoring other people creating what is
called a "downline." More people create a
tireater volume of sales upon which the
earlier sponsors receive a percentage as

compensation.
There is an incentive to
build ar. organization (downline) so that
future income will be at a much greater
amount because of the volume created b>
the organization.

**3 Subsequently, on March 7. 1991. Macris
received a letter from Images informing Macris that
us autouuahfication status was being suspended for
lack of actis its
Shorth thereafter, in a letter dated

March 29. !C>'M. Images informed Macris that it was
termmaiim: the Macris distributorship eutireh. The
reasons iiiven tor termination were Macris's testing ot

products after warnings not to do so, lack of activity

"-6 The trial scheduled for September 28, 1992. in
Macn.s /, was continued bv the trial court and finally
went to trial without a jury on February 16. 1995,
over three years after Images transferred its assets to

Newavs. |FN4) I he trial court held that Images had
materially breached its contract with Macris by
wrongfully suspending Macris's autoqualiflcation
status and terminating its distributorship tor lack ot
actisits. and that Macris was entitled to damages tor

that breach.

Images stipulated that it owed Macris

S360.681.20 in contract damages for subsequent
months, from March 1991 through August 31, 1992,
the date on which Images ceased doing business as a

multilevel marketing company.

The trial court

awarded Macris all the contract damages contained in
the stipulation.

FN4. The original trial date of September
28, 1992. was continued by the trial court, as
a result of a conflicting trial calendar, to

Images and its distributor force.

January 25, 1993. On January 3, 1993. the
parties stipulated to a continuance of the

~*4

Or. Apnl 1". 1991. Macris commenced an

taking over the case from Judge Christensen.

action aeauist Images for breach of contract \"\hwr^

After an additional continuance ot the trial
date bv the court because of its criminal

under the Agreement, and damaging activity to

trial date because Judge Burmngham was

I "i.

Much- aliened in that action that Images
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calendar, trial was scheduled lor February
16. 1995.

**7 Just two da\ s prior tc the above-mentioned trial
in Maoris I- February 14. 1995-Macns tiled the

present action against Nevavs and its president and
vice president. 1hoiras and Leslie Mower {"Macns II
"). It '1217 is this case. Macns II. that is presently
before us on certiorari.

**I0 In response, Maciis argued that res judicata
was inapplicable to its claims 10 the extent they
sought to bind Newavs to the judgment rendered
against Images in Macns I and to the extent they
sought additional contract damages. Macris argued
that its claims against Neways arose after Macris
filed its camplaint in Macris / and tl at res judicata
was therefore inapplicable.

In Macns II. Macris asserted

three claims in its complai it. First. Macris asserted a
claim for fraudulent transfer, under which Macris

alleged that Images's trans'er of its assets to Neways
was fraudulent pursuant to the Utah Fraudulent
Transfer Act, sec Utah Code Ann

^

25-6-5 I 1998).

because it was made with actual intent to limit the

damages available to Mains and to hinder Macris

from collecting the obligation owed by Images.
Second, Macris asserted a successor liability claim,
under which Macns claimed that because Newavs is

the successor corporalioi

of Images.

Macris

is

entitled to have Newavs held liable for all amounts

**11

Or November 14. 1995, Macris filed its own

motion for summary judgment, arguirg that because
Newavs admitted that it was the privy of Images for
res judicata purposes in its motion for summary
judgment, Macris should be granted a summary
judgment on its successor liability claim.
In
response. Neways argued that although it admitted it
was the p ivy of Images for res judicata purposes, it
did not admit that it was the successor to Images's
liabilities to Maoris and that genuine issues of
material fact precluded summary juegment on this
issue

due as contract damages from Images to Macris
awarded in Macns 1. Finally. Macris asserted an alter

**I2 On September 19. 1997, the trial court issued

esio claim, under which Maoris claimed that there is

its

no corporate distinction between Images and Neways
and that the corporations have used the corporate

summary judgment. UN-^J
The court granted
Newavs summary judgment on its claim that res
judicata barred Macris's fraudulent transfer, successor
liabilitv. and alter ego claims lo the extent thev
sought "further damages from Neways as a result ot
the breached contract with Image;." The trial court.
however, refused to hold that res judicata precluded
Macris's claims to the extent they sought to bind
Neways to the judgment rendered against Images in
Macns I. The court also granted Macris summary
judgment on its claim that Neways was Images's
successor and was therefore liable for the previous
judgment against Images.

shield of Newavs to avoid liabilitv to Macris.

"KN

Through the above-named claims,

Macris

sought to recover the following damages against
Newavs: first. Macris sought payment bv Neways of
the contract damages awarded against Images in
Macris I; second, Macris sought additional contract
damages not awarded in Macris /, consisting of its
share of the profits from its downlines accruing after
September 1, 199?-the date on which Images
transferred its assets to Ntwavs;

and third, Macris

memorandum

decision

on

both

motions

for

sought punitive damages for the alleged fraudulent
transfer of Images's assets to Newavs.

f\5. The memorandum decision contained
s atemeuts of fact and reached conclusions

**9 On October 19, 1995, Neways moved for
summary judgment, arguing that Macris s claims for
liaudulcnt transler, successor liabilitv, and alter ego
were barred bv res judical i.
Specillcally. Newavs
armied that because Macris knew of its claims against
Newavs vears before the trial against Images began.
Macris could and should have included its claims

against Newavs in that actijn. Newavs also argued
that the doctrine of res judicata precluded Macris
from pursuing additional ccntract damages m Macris
II. because the issue of cortract damages arising out
of Images's l(<9| bread of the distributorship
agreement had already been fully litigated and
deckled in Macns I

of law.

"13 Newavs appealed, [fN'O] arguing to the court
of appeals that while the trial cour. correctly held that
res judicata precluded Macrii from pursuing
additional contract *I218 damages in Macns II, it
erred bv failing to applv the doctrine of res judicata
lo bar M; cris's claims to the extent thev sought to
make Neways liable for the previous judgment
against Images. Neways argued that all of Macris's
claims, including its successor liabilitv' claim, could
and should have been included in the previous action
against Images. Neways further argued that the trial
eourt erred in granting Macris a summars judgment
on its claim that Newavs was Images's successor and
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was therefore responsible to pas the damageawarded Macns in the previous lawsuit against
Images.

FN6_ Newavs appealed to this court, which
poured the case over to the court of appeals
pursuant to section 78-2-2(4).
See Utah
>"pde__Ann,. >} . 78;2-2(4) ( I996):

Utah

R.App.P 42(a).

"14

judicata test that a partv need include later claims in
an action only it' the party was aware of the tacts
upon which the later claims were based at the time
the complaint was filed.
Second. Neways argues
that the court of appeals erred on review of the trial
court's decision by failing to address whether the
doctrine of res judicata precludes Macris from
pursuing additional contract damages-beyond those
awarded in Macris /--in the present action.

Macris cross-appealed, arguing that the trial

court ened in its determination that res

judicata

precluded Macris from pursuing further contract
damages in Macns II Macris reasoned that because
Its claims against Neways arose after it tiled its
complaint against Images in Macns 1. res judicata
was inapplicable to its claims to the extent the}
sought to enforce the judgment entered in Macns I
and to the extent thev sought additional contract
damages.

"M5

The court ot" appeals reversed both summars

STANDARD OF UFA IEW

[1][2]

**17

When

exercising

our certiorari

jurisdiction, "we review the decision ot the court of

appeals, not of the trial court." ('arner v. Pnhjech
Restoration, 944 P.2d 346. 3>0 (Utah 1997) (citing

'nuttcrticld v. Ohihn. 831 P.2d 9". 101 n. 2 jjjah
1992j).

The court of appeals' determination of

whether res

pidicata bars

an action presents a

question of law. "When reviewing questions of law,
we accord no particular deference to the conclusions
ot law made bv the court of appeals but review them
for correctness." Stale v Chnstereen 866 P.2d 533,

Sec A/,_-y_r^_jy_^Ais'i'_ilV A... VlLL'<aC,._C^ •

5^5 1Utah 1993) (citing Alien v I 'rah iJef't <>f

]990 CI Anjy 230. « r 14, 15. 986 I\2d_74S. In
reversim; the trial court's grant of summary judgment

Health. 850 P.2d 1267, 1269 iCtah 1993]; Landcs v.

m favor of Newavs. the court of appeals held that res

1.990j|.

ltidmnents

;udicata d:d not bar Macris's claims for fraudulent

transfer, successor liabilitv, and alter ego. 1 he court
reasoned that because the facts giving rise to Macris's
claims arose after Macns filed its amended complaint
in Macns I. the doctrine of res judicata was

ANALYSIS

1. MACRIS'S FRAl'DF'FFN I TRANS! FR,

SUCCESSOR LIABILITY, AND AFTLR FGO
CLAIMS

"MS We first address Nessavs's argument that the

inapplicable.
In so holding, the court of appeals
evpressiv adopted the rule, citing several courts m
other jurisdictions,, that a party need only include

court of appeals erred in its determination that

later claims in an action for res judicata purposes n

successor liability, and alter ego are not barred by res

the partv was aware of the facts upon which the later

ludicata.

Macris's

claims

for

fraudulent

M219

transfer.

claims were based at the time the cmrlamt u^

flea I he court of appeals, however, did not address
the issue of whether res judicata bars Macris from
recovering additional contract damages in the present

L;J[-1J **19 The doctrine of res judicata embraces
two distinct branches:

preclusion.

claim preclusion and issue

See S\\\uji^in\_Jjuen)ynmuun_Health

action. In addition, the court of appeals reversed the
trial court's «rant of summary judgment in favor ot
Macns. holding that material issues ot fact precluded

( 'are, 766 P.2d 1059. 1061 (Utah 1988).

summars judgment on Macris's claim that Newavs

precludes the relitigation of all issues that could have
been litigated as well as those that were, in fact,
litigated in the prior action.' " Schaer v State, 657

was Images's successor in liability.

"16 Newavs tiled a petition for a writ of certiorari
with this court, seeking review of the decision of the
court of appeals. We granted the petition. Newavs
armies that the court of appeals erred in its

Claim

preclusion involves the same parties or their privies
and

also

the

same cause of action. " 'and this

P-2d 1337. 1340 (Utah 1983) (quoting Searle Bros v_
Sea/le. 588 P.2d o89. 690 fl taJ^JJOj)

Issue

preclusion, on the other hand. " '.j'vit^ from a
different cause of action and prevents parties or their

determination that the doctrine of res judicata does

privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second

not

transfer.

suit that were fully litigated in the first suit.' " Id.

successor liabilitv. and alter ego.
In this regard.
Newavs raises tsvo arguments. First. Newavs argue^
that the court of appeals erred by adopting the res

] the important policy of preventing previously

bar

Macro's

claims

for

fraudulent

Iherefore. while both branches of res judicata "servef

litmated issues from h01112 rehtigated." different rules
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Salt Lah>' City v _SJIycr fork

court of appeals erred in adopting the above-

"t^ril'J^ A'<cni---.±] ' .I^AJIL 7-^ £Ulah_ I^J

mentioned test, and contends that this court should

iiovern each branch.

(citing Bcniod_y. \u Crearon_( 'rone, Inc.^i'69__P-2d
^7^_ 874-75. (Utah I9X3J,.
Neways relies upon
claim preclusion in arguing that Macris's claims m

adopt an alternate res judicata test requiring joinder

Macns II are barred by ies judicata because they

join such claims.
Neways contends that the res
judicata test adopted by the court of appeals is

could and should have been included in the action

the plaintiff has sufficient notice md opportunity to
inconsistent with this court's decision in Badger v

against Images in Macns I

L^J wil'20

of all claims arising before entry of judgment where

fiddlier, 6-Mltah "295, 25_4 P. 784 (l_9.27). and the

In order for claim preclusion to bar a

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

subsequent cause of action, a plaintiff must satisfy
**24 Newavs's reliance on Badger is misplaced.

In

three requirements'
First, both cases must involve the same parties or

Badger, the defendant twice petitioned the trial court

their privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be

for modification of a divorce decree. See Badger, 69

barred must have been presented in the First suit or

Utah at 2"6_-9'C 254 I1 at_._785-86

must be one that could ai d should have been raised
m the first action. I bird, the first suit must have
resulted in a Final judgment on the merits.

first petition sought modification on tne ground lh.it
the property settlement on which the decree was

Madscn yJlorthick, 769 PJ2jd_245. ?47 Fljtah !(,K8)
(citiiiii I'cnroil 609 _l'_.2d_at__875;
Bradsjiaw v

Aen/?l;io_627_P_2_d ^K^/JjT hah_l 98 1J; />:'_'/ Ac

based

was

induced

by

'1 he defendant's

th:

plaintiffs

misrepresentations and omissions concerning *1220
his assets.
See <>" 1 lah__a_L296-97, "154_P at 785.
The trial court modified the decree and ordered the

Diuificid, ^' P c:d 5_15T_M0-]7 (l"_ta]_i_ |9?9j,

plamtitl to pay the defendant an additional amount

Krojchcek v_Do\\ncy State Bank, 580 P.2d 245. 244
(Utah 1978); Bc/lisloii v 'I cxaca, hie , 52_t_P.2d i79;
3S0(I'la_h 1974J; .Xat'l Bin Co. v Haley, 14 Utah 2d

See 69 t jyth_ at 396,254 P..at..7_S5- S6. Two weeks
later, the defendant Filed a second petition, alleging

s'

263. 265-66. 382 P.2d 405. 407 (1903):

UJheadon v

Bearso,,_]4_y_Uh 2d 45,_4_7\_ -0 p;\| o_46. 947-4S
(1967)).
All three elements must be present tor
claim preclusion lo apply. Sec MailsenL 769|_P.2d at

other misrepresentations that the plaintiff had
originally made. See 6_9_Ctah at 290-9?, 2M P_ aj
7S6.
The plaintiff moved to strike the second
petition oi res judicata grounds, claaning that the
court's decision concerning the first aetitiou barred
relief on the second.

Sec 69 Utah at 298-99, 254 P.

In reference to the second element of the test

at 7S6 The trial court granted the motion. See 69
Utah at 299. 254 P. at 786.
Or appeal, this court

outlined above, Ncskuvs aigued before the court ol

afFirmed tie trial court's dismissa' of .he defendant's

appeals that Macris's claims for fraudulent transfer,
successor liability, and alter ego "should have been

second petition on res judicata grounds.

"21

raised" in Macns I because Maoris knew of its claims
against Newavs before the trial in Macns /began and
should therefore have amended its complaint in that
action and asserted the claims now pursued in the
present action.

[6J **22 The court of appeals rejected Neways's
argument

and

held

that

the

doctrine

ot' claim

preclusion did not require Macris to litigate its claims
against Neways in Macris i because "the facts giving
rise lo Macris's claims against Neways ... arose alter
Macris tiled its amended c implaini against Images"

Macns (V •l-ss.'hs v Seu_i\;y hh __l 999 C f \pp
2}(k__ 14. 9_S_6 P.2d ^48. In so holding, the court of'
appeals adopted the rule thai a party is required to
include claims in an action for res judicata purposes
onlv if "those claims ... arose before the filing of the

complaint in the first action " /./.at*' 9.

In so

holding, this court staled:
It affirmatively is made to appear that at the time

the first petition was filed for a modification ot the
decree of divorce the defendant knew the contents

of said decree and that she was to receive no

property except that actually awarded to her...
I'l ]he appellant had as much knowledge about the
plaintiff's propertv and income at th ' time she filed
her first petition as she had at the time she filed the
[second| petition which was stricken.
69 Utajj_jrj_301, 2jyLJ\_ai_;7_87 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, Badger is consistent with the rule thai a
plaintiff need onlv include claims in a suit for res
judicata purposes if the plaintiff was aware of the

facts upon which the later chums were based at the
tune the first suit was filed,

**25 Lq.tally misplaced is Neways's argument that
the court ol appeals' decision creates contusion
between the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the

**23 Newavs now armies before this court that the

doctrine of res judicata.
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "clearly establish an

intent that pleadings ... should be amended as
additional facts and claims are discovered" and a rule

requiring amendment for resjudicata purposes should
therefore be adopted While the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure do allow tor the amendment of pleadings

to add additional parties or claims for relief, they o]o
not require it. See Utah R.Civ.P. 15(a) ("A party
mav amend his pleading ...." (emphasis added)):
Utah R (dv.P. 20(a) ("All persons may be joined in
one action as defendants ...." (emphasis added n
Therefore, it is clear that the rule espoused oy

Newavs. requiring that pleadings be amended lor res
judicata purposes as additional facts and claims are

of action at the time the first suit was commenced.

but the cause of action in the present suit must be
identical to the one brought in the prior suit. See
Schaer, 657 P.2d at 134_0 (" 'In order for res judicata

to apply, both suits must involve the same parties or
their privies and also the same cause of action ....

"(quoting Scarlc Bros v Scarfc 5_88_ P.2_d._6_8_LC_69()
(Utah 1978])). In determining whether claims are
identical for res judicata purposes, this court has
focused on whether "[t]he two causes of action rest

I tali

on a different slate of facts and evidence of a
different kind or character is necessary to sustain the

Accordingly, we affirm

two causes of action." Schaer. 65" P.2d at 1340. .sec

discovered, would be inconsistent with the

Rule-, of Civil Procedure.

"1221 |8|[9j "*28 Moreoser. for the doctrine of res
judicata to preclude a subsequent cause of action, run
onlv must the plaintiff have been aware of the cause

the court of appeals' adoption of the rule that a party
is required to include claims in an action for re-judicata purposes only if those claims arose before
the tlliim of the complaint in the first action.

aBo 46

Ani.Jur-.2d _./jo^e/^'\^_.__534_j.l994j

(describing identity of facts or evidence test).
"Iherefore, even if a plaintiff is aware of the factual
basis of a suit at the tiling of another suit, he or she is
not obligated to bring all claims tugether if there is no

"26 A m.mher of states and federal courts in other

identitv

luri-d:ctions addressing this issue have come to a
similar conclusion, holding that parties are required

claims.

of facts and

ev idenee between the two

to include claims in an action for res judicata

**29

purposes onlv if those claims arose before the tiling

distributorship agreement between Macns and
Images in August 1989 and Images's 1991 breach of
that agreement.
In Macns I Macris and Images

of the complaint in the earlier action. See j!cacir.r. v
Liankjn,snc.L_i_o>T , .1 2_S_F^3d_94. 9" Cd_Or.J ^"j.

Macris I arose out of the formation of a

('i.iH/y^,'^ Int'l Inc. v. Altai. Jul . '26 I .3d
265. ^o9-70_C2d ( ir 1997J; Doe v Allied Signal.

Initialed whether an enforceable agreement existed

h\c_ t>S5_F.2d_908! 915__(7_th Cjr. ll>l>5.i: Manning v
Cm. • •' Ai<>juyn_ 9.5^ I .2d 1355. )3<>0_(i lth Or. 1^92 i.

Agreement, and the amount of damages that should

between the parties, whether Images breached that
be awarded for that breach.

Pdfc-a \ Sc^ariiv Pacific Brokers, /'v^_85C I22d

002. 6n9_L5jh__Cir.|9S8_); fos Angeles. JCaneh.
AAAL'IJ_v_Lm_ Angeles Unified Sc/l Ifst,^~p0 ! -l!
CM. "39 (9th Or 1984); /k/mo v_ ICWg A /)L
) .;,»:•/ /i.v 950 p 3d 5^4.j576 (Alaska__i^~J: />'"'''•

\ ,\T /<:._M> Uass. 5.8_^_5S" .P:2d .SjgT S15-F'*
iio"S). Puj_ra>!t_\ Oiia_n_ry\ first \'Cg _ Ine _ C
Idaho 55SC->03_P.3d 14~\ 14/9-50 (Ct:App.Lj_99.\), Ben
(' .lones A Co v Cammed Statesman Puhi'g (C_.

~*M)

In contrast, Macns

II arose out of the

formation of Neways in August 1992. the transfer by

Images of its assets to Neways on September 1, 1992,
three davs before the original trial date in Macns I,
and Newavs's subsequent takeover of Images's
multilevel marketing business
Macris based its
claims in Macris II on the Utah Fraudulent Transfer
Act and similar common law doctrines designed to

luo lev 32j3C)Q N.W. 701. 703 ( !9()"i.

protect creditors from the evasions of debtors.

i_"J "2" Apply in-; the test to the facts of this case,
the court of appeals was correct in concluding that res

its assets to Neways three days before the trial in
Macns 1 was scheduled to begin was fraudulent and

Specifically. Macris claimed that Images's transfer of

judicata does not bar Macris's claims against Neways
for fraudulent tram-fer. successor liability, and alter

e'iio
1mass's

Jne facts giving rise to Macris's claims-transfer

of its

assets

to

Neways

ano

Newavs's subsequent takeover of Images's businessdid not arise until after the filing of the complaint in
Maern I Thus. Macris was not obligated to amend
r.-. complain: in Ma^n^ I to include the clamts now

"indued m the present action against Ness ays

accomplished to limit the amount of damages
available to Macris and to hinder Macris horn

collecting the obligation owed by Images.

""31

Accordingly, it is clear that Macro's claims

against Neways in Macris II rest upon a different set
id' facts, and evidence of a different kind or character

is necessary to sustain the claims, than the breach of
contract litigation that was the subject of Macns I
iherefore, even if Macris had known of the relevant

(C 2005 Thomson West No Claim to Ong. U.S. (iovt. Works.

Page 8

16 P.3d 1214

16 P.3d 1214. 410 Utah Ads'. Rep. 11. 2000 UT 93
(Cite as: 16 P.3d 1214, 2000 UT 93)

facts of Macns II at the filing of Macns /-and it did
not-u still would have been justified in not including

decide whether res judicata prevents Macris from
seeking additional contract damages in Macns I!

lis fraudulent transfer, successor liability, and alter

"*36 Because the court of appeals did not address

ego claims in the first lawsi it.

this issue, we could remand the mailer to the court ol

II. ADDITIONAL CONITACI DAMAGFS

appeals for consideration. However, the issue has

*"32 We next address Neways's argument that the

been argued and briefed by both parties on certiorari,
and therefore, we are able to dispose of this issue

couri of appeals erred by failing to address the issue
raised on appeal of whether "res judicata" prevents
Macris from pursuing additional contract damages in

ourselves, and we elect to do so.

the present action- Macns ll

that Macris is precluded by res judicata, more
speciIlealK the issue preclusion branch of res
judicata, |F_N7] from pursuing additional contract

**}>}> In the proceeding below, the court ol appeals
determined that the claim preclusion branch ol the
doctrine of res judicata did not bar Macris's claims
for fraudulent transfer, successor liability, and alter
ego. "I he court of appeals, however, did not address
the issue of whether res judicata prevents Maoris

from pursuing additional

contract damages

not

recovered in Macns I through the above-named
claims

Resolution of the drst issue does not resolve

See State v.

Brooks, 908_P.2d 856, 86]_JUlah W5).

d,images in this case.

fN_7 Despite Newavs's imprecise use of the
term "res judicata." its ar-Uiment concerning
additional contract damages, as explained

above, is properly analyzed under the issue
preclusion branch of the djctrine of res
judicata In any event, the claim preclusion
branch of the doctrine of ics

the second.

**34 As noted above, the-e are two branches of res

judicata, claim preclusion and issue preclusion—also
known as collateral estoppel.
.S't e Sv_aj_ns-tr»i v
lntermo,intain_ Health. Canity) _P 2d 1059i_.106l
(Utah 1988), The Ivsic diTerence between the two
branches of res judicata is simply put: while "claim

preclusion applies to wholt claims, whether litigated
or not," and prevents parties from relitigating the
same claim in a second su t. 18 James Win. Moore.

Moore's federal Practice § 131.1311] (Matthew
Bender, 3d ed.2.000) (emphasis added), issue

preclusion, or collateral estoppel, arises Irom a
different cause of action and prevents parties or their

privies from relitigating "rarticulai issues that have
been contested and resob ed."

hi.

see afu>

M222Schaci_v. State, 6_57_P.2d i 3 w. .1.340 (Ulah
19S3J: Searle Bros v Sgarle, 588 P;2d_689, 690
(Utah 1978j. "Thus, it is important lo recogm/e lh.it

although the doctrines o! [claim preclusion! and
[issue preclusion] are closely related, they are usually
mutually exclusive." Schat i\J->5" P.2d at !_34_0.

We thus

turn our attention to the merits of Neways's argument

judicata is

inapplicable to Neways s a'gument. Ihis
court has previously staled t mt "[i|n order
lor [claim preclusion] to apply, both suits
must involve ... the sanw arise of action"

Seal le Bros , 588 P.2d at <y90 (emphasis
added). In contrast, issue preclusion "arises

from a different cause of action and prevents
parties ... from relitigating ... issues in the
second suit that were fully litigated m the
first suit.'' Id (emphasis added) (citing Ray
y Consol. I rejght\vays: 4 Ut::h_2d_j 37. I4F
289 P.2d 19d. 199X1955]); see a/so Schaer
657_P.2d at 1340 ("Where the claim ... is the
same in both cases, claim preclusion]
applies. But where the claim ... is different
in the two cases, then [issue preclusion! is
applicable "I We have already determined
that Macris's claims for fraudulent transfer,

successor

liability,

and

alter

ego

are

different than its breach of contract claim

raised in Maori'- I, see diicusdon supra part
1, in that the two causes ot' action rest on a
different slate of fads and evidence of a

[10J **•)$

Accordingly, the court of appeals'

determination that Macris's claims are not barred by

different kind or characier is necessary lo
sustain the two causes of action.
"I hus,

claim preclusion does not preclude a determination
that Macris is prevented oy the doctrine of issue
preclusion or collateral estoppel from seeking,
additional contract damages arising out of Macris I
through its claims for fraudulent transfer, successor

claim preclusion is inapplicable to Neways's
a'gument that Macris is barred from seeking
additional contract damages through the

liabilitv. and alter ego
We agree with Neways,
therelore. that the court of appeals did err in failing to

[1 1JL12J **37
We apply a four-part test to
determine whether the doctrine of issue preclusion is

anove-named claims.
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and fairly litigated in the previous action. Fourth.
the party against whom collateral estoppel is

first judgment.
See Int'l Res.. 599 P.2d at 517.
However, the preclusive effects of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel go further.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of
material facts or questions which were in issue and
adjudicated in a former action is applicable to all
matters essentially connected with the subject
matter of the litigation.
This application of the

invoked in the current action must have been either

general rule extends to questions necessarily

a party or privy to a party in the previous action.

involved in an issue ... although no specific finding
may have been made in reference to that matter,
and although such matters were not directly

applicable:

First, the issue challenged must be identical in the
previous action and in the case at hand. Second.
the

issue must

have

been

decided

in

a

final

judgment on the merits in the previous action.
Third, the issue must have been competently, fully.

Jones li'aldr,. Holbrook <K- McDonough v Dawson.
923 P.2d 1366. 1370 (Utah 1996):
.see also
Swainston, "66 P.2d at 1061. Ail four elements must

be present for issue preclusion to apply.

See Jones,

Hal Jo. Holbrook A McDonough, 923 P.2d .at_J_370.

Macris does not argue that there is no "identity of
issues" for collateral estoppel purposes. Therefore.
our analysis focuses on the second, third, and fourth
elements.

We address each element in turn.

referred to in the pleadings.
46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments i

545.

It follows,

therefore, that a party cannot by negligence or design
withhold issues and litigate them in separate actions.
If the second action involves an issue as to which the

judgment in a prior action is a conclusive
adjudication, the estoppel, so far as that issue is
concerned, extends to every matter which was or

A. Actually Litigated and Decided
""38 The second element outlined above requires
that the issue sought to be litigated in the present
action must have been decided in afinal judgment on

might have been urged to sustain or defeat the
determination actually made. See id.

the merits in the previous action. See id. Macris
does not argue that the judgment entered in Macris I
was not a final judgment on the merits. Therefore.
our analysis, with respect to the second element

1991 breach of contract was decided in Macris I.

Moreover, the effect of the trial court's award of
damages in Macris I embodied all damages: past,
present, and prospective. The Restatement supports

outlined above, focuses on whether the issue raised in

this view, reasoning:

the present case was "actually asserted and tried" in
the prior proceeding. Int'l Res, v. Dunfield. 599 P.2d
?15. 5P (Utah 1979).

* 1223 **39

In Macris I, the trial court determined

that a valid distributorship agreement existed
between Macris and Images, that Images breached

the Agreement, and that Macris was entitled to
damages as a result of that breach. Accordingly, the
trial court awarded Macris damages in the amounts

Images stipulated that it should have paid Macris for
subsequent months, from March 1991 through
August 31. 1992, the date on which Images ceased

**41 The issue of damages resulting from Images's

Typically, even when the injury caused by an
actionable wrong extends into the future and will
be felt beyond the date of judgment, the damages
awarded by the judgment are nevertheless
supposed to embody the money equivalent of the
entire injury. Accordingly, if a plaintiff who has
recovered a judgment against a defendant in a
certain

amount

becomes

dissatisfied

with

his

recovery and commences a second action to obtain
increased damages, the court will hold him
precluded; his claim has been merged in the
judgment and may not be split. It is immaterial
that in Irving the first action he was not in

doing business as a multilevel marketing company.

possession of enough information about the

In Macris II. Macris sought to litigate whether it was
entitled to additional contract damages not recovered
in Macns I arising after the date Images transferred

damages, past or prospective, or that the damages
turned out in fact to be unexpectedly large and in

its assets to Neways.

[13][ 14 j ""40 Macris argues that because the trial
court limited its award of damages to August 31.
1992. the issue of Macris's entitlement to damages

accruing after August 31, 1992. was never actually
litigated or decided in Macris I. Clearly, if an issue is
actually raised by proper pleadings and treated as an
issue in a case, it is conclusively determined by the

excess of the judgment.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments S

25 cmt. c

(1982) (emphasis added). Moreover, the trial court
made no finding that its award of damages in Macris
I was not final.

Therefore, because the trial court's

award of damages in Macris I was a conclusive
adjudication on the issue of damages resulting from

Images's 1991

breach of the autoqualiflcation

agreement, the issue of damages accruing after
August 1992 was connected to the subject matter and

€) 2005 Thomson West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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trial court.

necessarily decided in Mattis I.

**42 Macris further argues that because the issue of
contract damages was decided by stipulation, it was
not actually litigated and decided for collateral

Thus, it seems fair to sU.tc that Macris

had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of
damages accruing after August 31, 1992. in the prior
adjudication.
C. Privity

estoppel purposes.

[I5J **43 An issue determined by stipulation rather
than judicial resolution is binding in a subsequent
action if the parties manifested an intention to that
effect. Sec, e.g., 18 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R.
Miller & F.dward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 4443, at 382 (1981) ( "Issue preclusion
does not attach unless it is clearly shown that the

parties intended that the is>ue be foreclosed in other
litigation."):
18 James Win Moore, Moore's
Federal Practice M224 § 132.03|2][hj[ii] (Matthew
Bender, 3d ed. 2000) ("[S lipulation may be binding
in a subsequent action ... r the parties ... manifested
an intention to that effect.").
In this case, Macris
does not argue that th: stipulation concerning
contract damages was not binding in general: rather,
Macris argues that the stipjlation was not binding as
to damages accruing after August 31, 1992. the date
on which Images transfer "ed its assets to Neways.
However, if the stipulation is meant to be final as to
some damages but not final as to other damages, it
must say so. Our review of the record in this case,
however, evidences no such intention. Moreover, the
trial court made no finding that its damages awardwhich was based on the parties stipulation—was not
final as to all damages, "herefore, we find that the

stipulation in this case has -es judicata effect.

\ 1_6J **4fi Finally, the fourth clement of the test
outlined above also permits tae application of
collateral estoppel in this case. Unlike the doctrine
of claim preclusion, issue preclusion does not require
that "both cases ... involve the same parties or their
privies." Madsen. 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988)
(emphasis added). Rather, issue preclusion applies
even if only "the party against whom the [doctrine] is
asserted [was] a party or in privity with a party to the
prior adjudication." Swainston, 766 P.2d at 1061;
see also Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co.. 635 P.2d417,

419 (Utah 1981) ("[nfjutuality of parties is no longer
essential" for collateral estoppel purposes). In this
case, although Neways was a nonparty to Macris I.

the party against whom the doctrine of collateral
estoppel is asserted is Macris. It is clear that Macris
H, Associates, the plaintiff herein, is the same party as
Macris <\: Associates, the plaintiff in Macris I

Therefore, the party against whom the doctrine is
asserted—Macris—was a party to the prior
adjudication.

**46 On the basis of the foregoing, it is clear that all
of the recuirements of collateral estoppel have been

satisfied. Consequently, Macris is precluded from
relitigating the issue of damages arising from
Images's breach of the distributorship agreement in
this case.

B. Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate
**44

first case [was] competently, fully, and fairly
litigated."
See Swain.iton, _ 166 _P.2d__at [061
(citations omitted). MacrC argues that the issue of
contract damages accruing after August 31, 1992,
was not "competently, fully and fairly litigated"
because Neways's fraudu ent takeover of Images's
business prevented Macris from litigating such
damages. However, the record clearly establishes
that Macris was aware of Images's transfer of its
assets to Neways almost a year before Macris filed its
last pleading in Macris 1 aid two and one-hatf years
before the trial. During this two- and one-half-year
period. Macris enjoyed ample opportunity to conduct
unimpeded discovery and to fully develop its claim
for damages by examining Neways's financial
records.

CONCLUSION

In reference to the third element outlined

above, we must determine whether "the issue in the

Had

Mac "is

conducted

discovery

concerning future damages, it surely could have
included that evidence in the figures presented lo the

**47

correctly

We conclude that the co.irt of appeals

determined

that

Macris's

claims

for

fraudulent transfer, successor liability, and alter ego
are not barred by the doctrine of res Judicata. In so

holding, we affirm the court of appeals' adoption of
die res judicata test that a plaintiff need only include
later claims in an action for res judicata purposes if

the plaintiff was aware of the facts upon which the
later claims are based at the time the complaint was
filed. We further conclude, however, that Macris is

precluded by the issue preclusion branch of the
doctrine of res judicata from seeking additional
contract carnages through the above-named claims.
**48

Chief Justice HOWL, Just.ce DURHAM,

Justice [)i;RRANT. and Justice WJJ,KINS concur in
Associate Chief Justice RUSSON'S opinion.
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